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AN ANSWER TO REGULATION CRITICS -
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
James C. Thomas*
I. INTRODUCTION
How often have arguments been heard that federal adminis-
trative agencies represent an encroachment by the Federal Gov-
ernment upon our inherent rights to free enterprise and private
property? How often have we
SMr. Thomas received his B.S. heard that each time another regu-
in 1952, and his LL.B. in 1957, lation is imposed upon us, we are
from the University of Alabama.
In 1964 he received his LL.M. one step closer to socialism? Are
from the New York University these questions useful in arriving
School of Law. He is a member at some understanding of adminis-
of the Alabama Bar Association, trative law? When first introduced
and is presently Assistant Profes- to this field of law, students with
sor of Law at the University of conservative political views have
Tulsa.
such questions in mind. Before
they can grasp an understanding of this area of public law it is
necessary, and in fact imperative, that their political views be
brought under control. But this problem is not limited to students;
it is shared by many practicing attorneys.
By allowing political philosophy to control the mind, one's
ability to analyze true legal problems is diminished. In attacking
a particular administrative agency how successful will one be by
contending that the enacting statute violates our separation of
powers concept, or that it infringes upon our rights to private
property? With the development of administrative law, such at-
tacks have become more political than legal. As political philosophy,
such belongs in a political science discussion; it has no place in
the determination of our legal rights. Our question is: "what is
the law;" not "what the law ought to be."
After all political clouds are removed, the true problems of
administrative law emerge. With this as a central theme, perhaps
this paper is addressed to a limited audience, but even so, it
should serve a useful purpose. Until quite recently, this writer
would have been found in this limited audience where political
109
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idealogy outweighs legal determination. After carefully analyzing
this field of law, it was easy to see that individuals, appearing be-
fore agencies, could not be effectively represented unless this cloud
was removed. An individual, ordered to appear before the Federal
Trade Commission, does not care what his attorney's political views
are; he wants his constitutional rights protected. A person in busi-
ness seeking advice of counsel, wants assurance that he does not
violate various regulations. He also seeks assurance that arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable regulations are not being promulgated.
These are the true administrative law problems, and the question
is how these problems can effectively be handled.
Dividing this paper into three main headings, the following
will be discussed: Background to Regulations; A Regulated Econ-
omy; and An Answer to Regulation Critics.
II. BACKGROUND TO REGULATIONS
A. Absolute property concept
While even today we hear advocated the "absolute right to
property concept," we have never had such a doctrine in our sys-
tem of jurisprudence. Regulations imposed upon property can be
traced to the common law' and even to the American Colonies.2
As our legal system emerged from the ratification of the Consti-
tution, there was a strong belief in the freedom from interference
with private property. The early case of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward3 has been cited many times in support of arguments
against any regulations being imposed on private property. Chief
Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, declared that corporate
charters were contracts and thus protected under the Constitu-
tion's obligation clause.4 States were stripped of the power to regu-
late and restrain these creatures of their legislative will.
Since early corporate charters were issued by legislature, the
effect of Dartmouth College v. Woodward was robbed by reserva-
tion of the power to alter, amend or repeal in each charter issued.5
18 Anne c. 19 (1710). An early copyright statute imposed regulations
on prices that could be charged for books. Section IV of the Act provided:
"at if any bookseller or printer shall charge a price for a book which shall
be conceived by any person to be too high and unreasonable, it shall be law-
ful for any person to make complaint thereof ... ." See also: 2 BLACKSTONE,
ComIvmNTmUEs *154; Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Mon-
opolies, 21 U. Cm. L. ERn. 355 (1954).
2 Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New
England, 31 CoLum. L. REv. 416, 444 (1931). Families were assigned "from
I to 10 acres, for purposes of tillage, a portion of the produce to be deposited
in the common stock."
a 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 463 (1818).
4 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
5 1 Roses's NoEs ON U.S. BlETs. 958; 2 WAmwN, HsTony or
HARvARD LAw SCHOOL ch. 31. OMA. CONST. art. IX, § 47 provides: "The
Legislature shall have power to alter, amend, annul, revoke, or repeal any
charter of incorporation or franchise ....
['Vol. 1, No. 2
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Another early case, Fletcher v. Peck,6 is also cited in support of
the absolute right to property. In that case, the Court ruled that
a state legislature was without power to revoke a grant of prop-
erty regularly made for consideration.
Even if Dartmouth College and Fletcher v. Peck could be con-
strued as supporting an absolute freedom from interference, the
tide turned in 1837 with the decision rendered in Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge." When this case was decided, Roger
Taney had replaced John Marshall as Chief Justice which might
have influenced the decision that issuance of a franchise, by the
Massachusetts legislature, for a second bridge did not violate an
earlier franchise issued to the Charles River Bridge. Viewing the
decision in retrospect, we could conclude that "public policy" de-
manded its outcome. What would be the effect of an opposite
decision in developing the community and its economy? With this
case, we are moving away from the idea of freedom from interfer-
ence where "public interese' demands a deviation.
While this "public interest" would encourage and support gov-
ernment regulations, the area of our economy regulated was, at
first, very narrow. The federal government was reluctant in impos-
ing any form of regulation on private business until the latter part
of the nineteenth century. Early regulations were imposed to correct
abuse of power exercised by railroads; later regulations were im-
posed on industry to encourage development of certain areas of
commerce.
B. Abuses resulting in regulations
Historical accounts of the development of railroad and in-
dustrial empires demonstrate the need for some form of govern-
mental regulations. In the early part of the nineteenth century
there were strict laws imposed on corporations. Stockholders were
held liable for corporate debts and corporations were strictly lim-
ited to the purposes specified in charters issued by legislature. Levi
Lincoln, Governor of Massachusetts, recommended a relaxation of
duties imposed upon corporations,8 observing that these bodies had
accumulated much capital but because of strict corporate laws,
this capital was being diverted to other states.
More liberal laws of incorporation were favored by those who
recognized such liberalism as a benefit to economic growth. Gov-
ernor Lincoln thought that charters should be granted sparingly
and that the business must have a beneficial purpose. In fact, he
would veto charters where they were not for a needed enterprise.
Certain factions voiced fear that corporations, after accumulating
enough capital, would control the government - its courts and
610 U.S. (6 Cranch) 328 (1810).
736 U.S. (11 Pet.) 496 (1837).
8 For a general discussion of early corporations development see 2
W.amiE, HISTORY oF HARvARD LAW ScHooL, ch. 31.
19643
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its legislatures. The desire, however, to encourage business, as a
means of economic development out-weighed any fear of potential
power from accumulated capital.
Especially where railroads were concerned, courts gave in-
dustry favored treatment. In 1884, Chief Justice Shaw announced
that it was the incontestable right of the state to appropriate prop-
erty for public use in cases of railroads since they were "public
works."9 Then, in Worcester v. Western R.R.,10 Shaw held that
railroads were exempt from a town tax on the ground that they
were "public works." This desire to encourage business clearly
affected Shaw's decisions; and this same desire affected decisions
rendered by other courts."1 Even today, we find states giving fav-
ored treatment to entice corporations to establish plants within their
boundaries.
Corporations continued to grow and in 1889, they were given
the right to take a national scope. In that year, the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Bank of Augusta v. Earle12 which es-
tablished the "artificial being of a corporation." The corporations,
for business purposes, had been granted citizenship. No longer
would they be required to seek legal remedy in the state of incor-
poration. They could now file suit to protect their rights in any
state where jurisdiction was established. This, perhaps, is the most
important opinion that can be cited to show how power of corpor-
ations was expanded to a national scale. Without it, we would have
natural -territorial limitations upon corporations.
Daniel Webster in support of the Bank of Augusta decision
argued that it was necessary for development of our national com-
mercial system. Opposing this view, Ingersoll spoke of the danger
of increasing corporate power. He stated that corporations would
eliminate the Federal Constitution and the states. Corporations
would become the sovereign; states would become the subjects.18
From this power came abuse, first in the railroad industry and
then in other large corporate empires. Men who pioneered railroad
and industrial empires did not, at all times, remain within legal
boundaries, nor did they keep in mind the welfare of the general
public. Cornelius Vanderbilt was reported once to have said: 'What
do I care about the law? Hain't I got the power?"14 His son, Wil-
liam, later said: "The public be damned."'(
9 Wellington, Petitioners, 33 Mass. 87 102-103 (1834) as cited in Levy,
Chief Justice Shaw and The Formative Period of American Railroad Law, 51
CoLum. L. REv. 327 (1951).
10 45 Mass. 564 (1842).
11 See Reid. Henry Brannon and Marmaduke Dent: The Shapers of West
Virginia Law, 65 W. VA. L. Bxv. 19 (1963).
1238 U.S. (13 Pet.) 277 (1839).
13 For a discussion of the effect of Bank of Augusta v. Earle on corpor-
ate law, see 2 WArmEN, op. cit. supra note 8, ch. 31.
14 Vanderbilt was alleged to have also written the following letter: "Gen-
tlemen: You have undertaken to cheab me. I will not sue you, for law takes
too long. I will ruin you." JosErissoN, Tim RoB=n BAnoNs 15 (1934).
[Vrol. 1, No. 2.
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Through corruption, discrimination, unlawful acts and some-
times physical violence, railroad lines increased from 35,085 miles
in 1865 to 254,037 in 1916; and gross railroad revenue increased
from 800 million dollars in 1865 to over 4 billion dollars in 1917.16
During this same period, Rockefeller's interest in oil spread and
became strong enough to force rebates from railroads.'7 In the
now famous Standard Oil Co. of N. 1. case, Justice Harlan described
conditions of the business world in 1890, which aroused Congress
to pass the Sherman Act.'8 He stated:
"All who recall the condition of the country in 1890 will re-
member that there was everywhere, among the people gen-
erally, a deep feeling of unrest. The Nation had been rid of
human slavery ... but the conviction was universal that the
country was in real danger from another kind of slavery
sought to be fastened on the American people, namely, the
slavery that would result from aggregations of capital in the
hands of a few individuals and corporations controlling, for
their own profit and advantage exclusively, the entire business
of the country, including the production and sale of the neces-
saries of life. Such a danger was thought to be then imminent,
and all felt that it must be met firmly and by such statutory
regulations as would adequately protect the people against
oppression and wrong."19
Congressional debates on the Sherman Act include repeated
descriptions of economic conditions that led to governmental inter-
vention and regulations. An example of language found in the
Congressional Record follows:
"Certainly there is no subject likely to engage the attention of
the present Congress in which the people of this country are
more deeply interested than in the subject of trusts and com-
binations. These evils have grown within the last few years
to an enormous magnitude; enormous also in their numbers.
They cover nearly all the great branches of trade and of pro-
duction in which our country is interested. They grow out of
the present tendency of economic affairs throughout the world.
It is a sad thought to the philanthropist that the present system
of production and of exchange is having that tendency which
is sure at some not very distant day to crush out all small
men, all small capitalists, all small enterprises. This is being
Is STOVER, A2mscAx Rr BAoAms 111 (1961).
1 SToVER, op. cit. supra note 15 at 104-105.
17 JOSpHSON, op. cit. supra note 14 at 113. This covers the growth of
Standard.
18221 U.S. 1 (1911). Standard Oil of New Jersey was declared to be
a monopoly and was ordered to divest itself of certain interests. The Court
also established the "rule of reason" and it was this that caused Justice Har-
lan to dissent.
'9 Id. at 83-84.
19643
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done now. We find everywhere over our land the wrecks of
small independent enterprises thrown in our pathway."20
With this background, a reluctant federal government begins
to impose regulations and controls on American industry. This is
not to imply that laissez-faire was the order of the day before the
advent of federal control in our economy, for states had long at-
tempted to exercise effective regulations. It would, here, be appro-
priate to review these early controls.
C. Early regulations
1. State. As noted above, states attempted to control and regu-
late industry, particularly railroads; however, as we shall see, these
controls were ineffective. In the formative years of railroads, legis-
latures expressly reserved rate-fixing powers within the charters.2 '
Railroad Commissions or regulatory bodies were established in
Rhode Island, 1839; New Hampshire, 1844; Connecticut, 1853; Ver-
mont, 1855; and Maine, 1858;22 but it was in the mid-western states
where we witness the great conflict between the railroad interest
and the granger movement.23 From the first Grange, founded in
Minnesota in 1867, there was a strong movement by 1875 with
20,000 local Granges and 800,000 members.24 Mainly due to this
force, states began to impose regulations on railroads.
In Munn v. Illinois,25 the Supreme Court affirmed a state stat-
ute that fixed maximum rates to be charged for the storage of grain
in elevators owned by railroad interests. The Court held that private
property, when affected with a public interest, ceased to be jurs
privati only. Property becomes clothed with a public interest when
used in a manner to make it of public consequences, thus affect-
ing the community at large. By devoting property to a use in which
the public has an interest, one, in effect, grants to the public an
interest in that use, and must submit to controls and regulations
necessary for public interest.
Justice Field, with Justice Strong concurring, wrote a vigor-
ous dissent in which he stated that: "The principle upon which
the opinion of the majority proceeds is, in my judgment, subversive
of the rights of private property, heretofore believed to be pro-
2021 CONG. REc. 2598 (1890) (remarks of Senator George); Senator
George made his observation while objecting to the passage of the Sherman
Act. He did not believe that Congress had any constitutional power to pass
an antitrust bill.2 1Levy, supra note 9 at 343-344. "The chief issue of debate," says Levy,
"was whether there should be government ownership or private ownership
under strict government regulation; the right of the legislature to intervene
in the economy was not questioned."
22 STOVER, op. cit. supra note at 15 at 125.
23 STOVER, Op. cit. supra note 15 at 127. The granger movement was
started by Oliver H. Kelley when he founded The National Grange of The
Patrons of Husbandry in 1867.24 SToVER, op. cit. supra note 15 at 127.
25 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
[Vol. 1, No. 2
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tected by constitutional guaranties against legislative interfer-
ence."26 Continuing with his dissent, Justice Field stated:
"The declaration of the Constitution of 1870, that private
buildings used for private purposes shall be deemed public in-
stitutions, does not make them so. The receipt and storage
of grain in a building erected by private means for that pur-
pose does not constitute the building a public warehouse. There
is no magic in the language, though used by a constitutional
convention, which can change a private business into a public
one, or alter the character of the building in which the busi-
ness is transacted. A tailor's or a shoemaker's shop would
still retain its private character, even though the assembled
wisdom of the State should declare, by organic act or legisla-
tive ordinance, that such a place was a public workshop, and
that the workmen were public tailors or public shoemakers.
One might as well attempt to change the nature of colors, by
giving them a new designation. The defendants were no more
public warehousemen, as justly observed by counsel, than the
merchant who sells his merchandise to the public is a public
merchant, or the blacksmith who shoes horses for the public
is a public blacksmith; and it was a strange notion that by
calling them so they would be brought under legislative con-
trol.27
If this be sound law, if there be no protection, either in the
principles upon which our republican government is founded,
or in the prohibitions of the Constitution against such invasion
of private rights, all property and all business in the State are
held at the mercy of a majority of its legislature. The public
has no greater interest in the use of buildings for the storage of
grain than it has in the use of buildings for the residences of
families."28
The Munn case, simply stated, holds that private property,
"affected with a public interest," is subject to state control 'nd
regulations. In the earlier years of railroads this same "public
interest" had been justification for the special consideration claimed
and received by them.29 Subsequent to the Fourteenth Amendment,
railroads characterized themselves as "private enterprises" in order
to escape state regulations.30
State regulatory power was extended in Peik v. Chicago &
N. W. Ry. Co.,31 when the Court upheld a state's right to regulate
fare and freight rates on railroads even though such regulations
26 Id. at 136.
27 Id. at 138.
28 Id. at 140.
29 Levy, supra note 9 at 327.
3o Ibid.
3194 U.S. 164 (1877).
19643
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affected interstate commerce. As to the effect of a state statute
regulating interstate commerce, the Court said:
"The law is confined to State commerce, or such inter-state
commerce as directly affects the people of Wisconsin. Until
Congress acts in reference to the relations of this company to
inter-state commerce, it is certainly within the power of Wis-
consin to regulate its fares ... , so far as they are of domestic
concern. With the people of Wisconsin this company has
domestic relations. Incidentally, these may reach beyond the
State. But certainly, until Congress undertakes to legislate
for those who are without the State, Wisconsin may provide
for those within, even though it may indirectly affect those
without."32
For some eleven years, states, under the Peik case, were held
to have power to regulate businesses even though such might affect
interstate commerce. During this time, Congress was being urged
to take action.3 3 Voices were being raised that "railroad regulation"
was too big a problem for states,s4 but even so, Congress refused
to take any positive action until 1887. Perhaps the first step toward
entry of federal controls into the economy would have been further
delayed except for the Supreme Court's change of views.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to say whether the Court had
a mere change of heart or whether it heard the public cry for
federal regulation of railroads. Whatever the reason, the Court, in
Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois r decided that "railroad regula-
tion" was too big a problem for states. Illinois had passed a statute
designed to prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in freight
rates charged by the different railroads in the state.30 Holding the
statute to be unconstitutional, the Court stated:
"Of the justice or propriety of the principle which lies at the
foundation of the Illinois statute it is not the province of this
court to speak. As restricted to a transportation which begins
and ends within the limits of the State, it may be very just
and equitable, and it certainly is the province of the State
legislature to determine that question. But when it is at-
32 Id. at 177-178.
33 STovEs, op. cit. supra note 15 at 126. In 1872 Congress investigated
the railroad industry and found many abuses, but it took no positive action.34 STOVER, op. cit. supra note 15 at 130.
35 118 U.S. 557 (1886). Cases have since shown that other problems
are too big for states. In State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E.
279 (1892), a quo warranto proceeding was commenced against Standard
of Ohio for the purpose of breaking up the oil trust. While the state court
ruled the trust to be illegal, the power of the monopoly continued until the
federal antitrust laws were applied in Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911).
36 Id. at 562. For violation of statute a penalty of $5,000 could be im-
posed; also a private person injured had the right to recover treble dam-
ages.
[Vol. 1, No. 2
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tempted to apply to transportation through an entire series
of States a principle of this kind, and each one of the States
shall attempt to establish its own rates of transportation, its
own methods to prevent discrimination in rates, or to permit
it, the deleterious influence upon the freedom of commerce
among the States and upon the transit of goods through those
States cannot be over estimated. That this species of regulation
is one which must be, if established at all, of a general and
national character, and cannot be safely and wisely remitted
to local rules and local regulations, we think is clear from
what has already been said. And if it be a regulation of
commerce, as we think we have demonstrated it is, and as
the Illinois court concedes it to be, it must be of that national
character, and the regulation can only appropriately exist by
general rules and principles, which demand that it should be
done by the Congress of the United States under the com-
merce clause of the Constitution."37
After this decision, we either would have no regulations on
interstate railroads or would have national regulations applying
uniformily to all railroads. It should be remembered that the gran-
ger movement had become a powerful political force and their
demands for control of railroads could not be ignored.
2. Federal. In 1887, Congress, making its first entry into the
regulation of economy arena, passed the Interstate Commerce Act,
which applied to all common carriers transporting passengers or
property by railroad or water.38 There was nothing bold about the
Act. In fact, it showed how timid and reluctant the national gov-
ernment was in exercising any control or regulation over our econ-
omy. But the Act did represent federal regulation and it is this
factor that makes it so important. Just as a small child, the federal
government had taken its first step, and with this step, our nation
was destined for a regulated economy.
III. A REGULATED ECONOMY
We now live in a complex society. Wagon trails have been
replaced by freeways; wagons, as early modes of transportation,
have been replaced by railroads, powerful automobiles, and super-
sonic jets. Time required to travel across our great nation has been
reduced from months to a matter of a few hours. Geographical
frontiers, such as the old wild west, have been replaced by scientific
frontiers. As our society advances and becomes more complex, there
must be advancement and changes in our economy.
Economies have changed in this country as they have around
the world. These changes, accomplished in some countries by
37 Id. at 577 [Emphasis added).
3824 Stat. 379 (1887). There was no effective enforcement procedure
for the Commission's cease and desist orders; thus, the violator could dis-
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revolutions, were attained in the United States by regulations.
"Faced with the increased tempo of life and the increased com-
plexities of our economy, there are presented only two possible
alternatives. One is the establishment of proper regulation in the
public interest .... The other course open is government owner-
ship and operation of the instruments of production, transportation
and public service. You call it socialism, or you can go a few steps
beyond and have communism." 9 Richard B. McEntire, who de-
livered these words, continued by saying:
"Proper regulation is the keystone to the maintenance of a
free economy liberated from the threat of government owner-
ship. And I firmly believe that those who urge that we
eliminate substantially all regulation and return to the laissez-
faire theory of a century ago, are unwittingly but surely play-
ing into the hands of those groups that are seeking to overthrow
our system of free enterprise."40
It was not federal control and regulations that eliminated or
at least de-emphasized laissez-faire, for long before this advent,
states freely regulated their economy. Speaking of Massachusetts,
Levy points out that: "The rights of property, though adequately
protected, were ranked second to the rights of the Commonwealth.
To Chief Justice Shaw the concept of the 'Common-Wealth meant
a working partnership between government, people, and capital to
build and grow together for the greater good of the community."41
Whether one can agree with this philosophy-working partnership
-is immaterial. To advocate the elimination of all controls is useless
and idle thinking. We have regulations and there is little likelihood
that they will be reduced. Instead, such regulations are being in-
creased as our economy becomes more complex.
A. Federal
Once Congress had created the first federal regulatory agency,
it would become easier to establish others. It was like breaking
the four-ninute mile. The question would not be whether regula-
tions should be imposed; it would be how could such regulations
be made effective?
39 Bichard B. McEntire, A Regulator Looks at Regulation, an address
delivered before the National Association of Securities Administrators, Jack-
sonville, Florida, on October 2, 1947 and excerpted in G.LLHonN & Bysr,
ADzmasmTTVE LAW 8 (4th ed. 1960). When the F.T.C. Act was before
Congress, some Congressmen favored strict controls on corporations. Mr.
Morgan of Oklahoma stated: "If necessary for the public welfare we should
authorize the Commission to regulate the prices at which large industrial
corporations shall dispose of their products." Such was justified, thought Mr.
Morgan, because of their size. "They are in every legitimate sense of the
word quasi-public corporations, and we should by law declare them to be
such." 51 CoNG. BEc. 1866, 1870-71 (1914).
40 GELLiORN & BysE, op. cit. supra note 39 at 9.
41 Levy, supra note 9 at 348.
[V'ol. 1, No. 2
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In 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act 42 was enacted for the
purpose of ridding the country of trusts and combinations. It pro-
vided that every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade is illegal;43 and every
person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. 44 Though its purpose and dir6c-
tive was clearly stated, the Sherman Act was not, at first, effective.4 5
To supplement the Act, Congress passed the Clayton Act46 and the
Federal Trade Commission Act.47 While these bills were being
debated, there were charges and counter charges as to why the
Sherman Act had failed.4 8
Unlike most other agencies, the Federal Trade Commission
Act cuts across all phases of our economy subject to certain excep-
tions enumerated in the Act.49 In broad terms, it declares that
unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in commerce are unlawful.5 0 The Commission
was given power to gather and compile information, and to inves-
tigate organization, business, conduct, practices and management
of any corporation engaged in commerce.51 Upon resolution of
both houses of Congress, the Commission may be directed to carry
out certain investigations. 52 Federal Trade Commission investiga-
tions preceded and influenced the Congressional passage of the
Federal Power Act, Securities Act, Securities Exchange Act, Pub-
lic Utility Holding Company Act and the Natural Gas Act.1
3
4226 Stat. 209 (1890) (Sherman Antitrust Act).
43 Sherman Act § 1.
44Sherman Act § 2.
45 While the statute states that "every contract . . . in restraint of trade
is illegal," the Supreme Court, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1 (1911) and United States v. Ameircan Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911),
construed this to mean "unreasonable restraint." Viewing these decisions
on the floor of Congress, Mr. Murdock stated that while the Court used
harsh language, it was reluctant to issue strong decrees. 51 CoNG. REc. 9873.
8976 (1914).
4638 Stat. 730 (1914).
4738 Stat. 717 (1914).
48 House debates: 51 CoNG. REc. 1866, 8840 (1914); Senate debates: 51
CoNG. REc. 11081, 11237 (1914).
49F.T.C. Act § 5(a) (6), 38 Stat. 717 (1914) as amended 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-58 (1958); See also FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Co., 344 U.S.
392, 404, 405 (1952) where the Court compares the auth6rity given to the
F.T.C. with that given to the I.C.C.: "EThe Interstate Commerce Act dealt
with governmental regulations .. . of a limited sector of the economy ....
On the other hand, the Federal Trade Commission Act gave an administrative
agency authority over . . . restrictions upon the whole domain of economic
enterprise engaged in interstate commerce."
50 F.T.C. Act § 5 (a)(1).
51F.T.C. Act § 6(a).
52F.T.C. Act § 6(a). For cases concerning this power see, FTC v. Na-
tional Biscuit Co., 18 F.Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) and FTC v. American
Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924) where the tobacco industry was being
investigated.53 See Davis, The Influence of the Federal Trade Commissionds Inves-
tigations, 14 GEo. WAsr. L. 1Ev. 21 (1945).
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The Federal Power Commission was established as an inde-
pendent regulatory agency in 1930,54 with power to regulate an
important area of our economy. Its jurisdiction extends over the
transmission and sale of electric energy5,5 the transportation and
sale of natural gas, 55 and the public uility and natural gas com-
panies engaged in interstate commerce.
There is no need to cite the many federal agencies that now
effectively regulate certain segments of our economy, but perhaps
a few should be mentioned. Civil aviation is effectively controlled
by the Civil Aeronautics Board 57 and the Federal Aviation Agen-
cy 58 egulation of interstate and foreign commerce in communi-
cation by wire and radio is exercised by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission.59 The general public is protected from fradulent
sales of securities by the Securities and Exchange Commission.60
And workers are protected against unfair labor practices by the
National Labor Relations Board.6
We could continue with this enumeration; however, the point
has clearly been made-we live in a regulated economy. Since 1887,
when Congress took its first regulatory step, meaning has been
given to the words: "The Congress shall have Power To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes."6 2 Our daily lives are greatly affected
by federal regulations through minimum wage laws, food quality
controls, and false advertising prohibitions. If a segment of our
economy can be found without some federal control involved, one
can perhaps find a state control.
B. State
States were exercising regulations and controld over our econ-
omy long before the federal government entered the field. Through
their so-called "police powers," states may enact laws reasonale
and necessary for the comfort, safety, health and welfare of the
general public. Under this power, forty-eight states have enacted
blue sky laws; and forty-four states have enacted fair trade laws.04
Rather than attempting a broad general survey of state controls,
5446 Stat. 797 (1930); prior to this time there had been a Power Com-
mission with jurisdiction limited to the licensing of hydroelectric projects on
Government lands and navigable waters. It was made up of the Secretaries
of War, Agriculture, and Interior.
5549 Stat. 838 (1935) (citations show only original enactment).
5652 Stat. 821 (1938).
5752 Stat. 973 (1938).
58 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
59 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
6048 Stat. 881 (1934).
6149 Stat. 449 (1935).
6 2 U. S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8.
63 1 Loss, SECUMTIEs REGULATION, 30 (1961). Only Delaware and Ne-
vada have no such laws. For official citations of these statutes see: 3 Loss,
SEcuarrIEs REGLATION, app. B.
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it might be more satisfactory to limit the discussion to a single state.
For this limited review, the State of Oklahoma has been selected.
By the time Oklahoma joined the Union in 1907, regulations
were nothing new, and rebates, unlawful discrimination and abuse
of power by railroads and giant industrial firms were being dis-
cussed openly.65 This may account for the fact that thirty-four
distinct offices, boards, commissions, and departments were either
created or provided for in the State Constitution. 6  The Constitu-
tion specifically creates the office of Chief Inspector of Mines; 61
Department of Labor;68 Insurance Department;69 Commissioner
of Charities and Corrections; 0 and the Board of Agriculture. 1
While these agencies were created by the Constitution, the Legis-
lature was given power to establish the scope of duties or was given
power to amend, alter and add to the duties specified in the basic
law. In creating the Corporation Commission 72 and the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board,73 the Constitution specified duties, re-
strictions, powers and procedure in great detail.
Singling out the Corporation Commission for a closer examin-
ation it is apparent that the drafters of the Oklahoma Constitution
were influenced by economic conditions then present. Railroads
64 2 C.C.H. TRADE BEG. REP. 1 6017. Of these 44 states, 21 have held
the non-signer provision to be unconstitutional; 4 states held the fair trade
law, in general to be unconstitutional. See 2 C.C.H. TPAD BEG(. REP. 1 6401.
05 Governor LaFollette of Wisconsin reported that an investigation of
railroads in his state disclosed that rebates and unlawful discrimination
amounted to $7,000,000 with every major line guilty of these practices. SToVER
op. cit. supra note 15 at 137.
60 State Administrative Agencies, Constitutionally Prescribed Powers and
Duties, 5 OKLAHOMA STATE LEGISLATrvm CotNcm (1953). The number 34
includes all the regular state offices such as Governor, Attorney G en e r a l,
etc.; however, many of the administrative agencies were established through
the Constitution.6 7 OKLA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 25. Qualifications of person elected are speci-
fied but duties, compensation etc., are to be defined by the legislature. See
45 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-406 (1961) and 74 OKLA. STAT.§ 251 (1981).6 8 OKLA. CONT. art. VI, § 20. Commissioner to be elected by the people
and his duties prescribed by law; art. VI, § 21 provides that the Legislature
shall create a Board of Arbitration and Conciliation. See 40 OX-A. STAT.§§ 1-311 (1961).69 OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 22. Charged with duty of enforcing all in-
surance laws; art. VI, § 23 provides that the Insurance Commissioner shall
be an elected official. See 36 OKLA. STAT. §§ 301-348.1 (1961).
70 OELA. CONST. art. VI, § 27, Commissioner elected; § 28 powers and
duties specified (investigate prisons, jails, hospitals, etc.) (power to issue
summons, etc.); § 30 Legislature shall have power to alter, amend, or add
to duties of Commissioner. See 74 Ox-A. STAT. §§ 171-186 (1961).71 Os-.. CoNsT. art. VI, § 31. A five member board is elected, all of
whom shall be farmers. The board has jurisdiction over all matters affecting
animal industry and animal quarantine regulations. See 2 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-11(1961).
72 OKLA. CONST. art. LX, §§ 15-35.
73 OKLA. CONsT. art. XXVII, §§ 1-11. This was by amendment passed
on April 7, 1959. Prior to this time there was prohibition in Oklahoma under
OLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 7.
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could not consolidate without written approval;74 passes for free
transportation could not be issued except to certain specified per-
sons; 75 the Commnissioners, as elected officials, could have no
direct or indirect interest in any railroad, canal, steam boat, pipe
line, etc.70 The "powers and duties" section provided that: "The
Commission shall have the power and authority and be charged
with the duty of supervising, regulating and controlling all trans-
portation and transmission companies doing business in this State
.... Included within this power was the right to promulgate
rules and regulations, examine books and records, prescribe and
fix rates, etc. Procedural safeguards were provided and included
publication of proposed rulings, hearings, and right to appeal.
Where such detailed regulations are placed in the Constitu-
tion, the delegation question is eliminated and there is little room
for undue influence to work against legislators. At the same time,
however, a desirable flexibility is eliminated since certain changes
could be made only by constitutional amendment. To partially
offset this limitation on change, the Constitution provided that after
the second Monday in January, 1909, the Legislature may from
time to time, alter, amend, revise, or repeal sections 18-84.78
In areas where the Oklahoma Constitution did not create the
agency, it directed the Legislature to do so. "The Legislature shall
create a Board of Health, 9 Board of Dentistry,8" Board of Phar-
macy,81 and Pure Food Commission,82 and prescribe the duties of
each."38 Monopolies, destruction of competition for the purpose of
creating a monopoly, and discrimination between different purch-
asers are prohibited by the Constitution.84 The Legislature is di-
rected to define such practices and to enact laws to punish persons
so engaged.8 5 Perhaps the broadest constitutional control device
is the provision that empowers the Legislature to alter, amend,
74 OKLA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 9. One of the early complaints regarding rail-
roads was that large lines, through unfair methods of competition, were swal-
lowing the smaller lines.
75 OELA. CONST. art IX, § 13. "All sections of the country complained
about the influence railroads exercised over public officials through the uni-
versal practice of granting free passes to congressmen, judges, sheriffs, ases-
sors, and even town officials." STOVER, op. cit. supra note 15 at 123.7 6 OKLA. Co~rsT. art. IX, § 16.
77 OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 18.78 OKLA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 35. See 17 Ox:rA. STAT. §§ 1-189 (1981) and
18 OKLA. STAT. §§ 438.1-438.,34 (1961), especially 438 .32 where the statute
expressly provided that the constitution was being, herein, amended.
79 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-46.6 (1961).
80 59 OKLA. STAT. § 327.7 (1961).
8159 OKLA. STAT. § 353.1 (1961).
82 63 OxLA. STAT. §§ 1.2, 251 (1961).
83 OKLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 39.84 OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 45.
85 OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 44. See 79 OKLA. STAT.§§1-36 (1961) (monop-
olies, combinations, etc., declared illegal) (worded after Sherman Anti-
trust Act); 79 OLaA. STAT. §§ 81-87 (1961) which prohibits unfair discrimin-
ation or unfair competition.
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annul, revoke or repeal any charter of incorporation whenever, in
its opinion, it may be injurious to the citizens of the State.s 6
Other controls placed upon the state's economy by the Legis-
lature, through its "police powers," include the following: Unfair
Sales Act,87 Fair Trade Act,8 8 Barbers' Unfair Trade Act, 9 Blue
Sky Laws," and the Watchmaking Act.9 1 This is by no means a
complete list of controls and regulations but enough has been
said to show that even within a state, we live in a regulated econ-
omy.
C. City and County
Cities, towns and counties also exercise control and regulations
over certain important segments of our economy. Zoning ordinanc-
es are the best example of controls exercised by municipal corpor-
ations. Under this authority, one's use of property is restricted. He
cannot build a factory on a residential site nor can he construct an
apartment house in an area zoned for single unit dwellings. Even
where one is allowed to construct a house, building, apartment or
factory, certain building specifications must be satisfied. The
structure might be required to be a certain number of feet from
the street, and the floor might have to be a certain distance off
the ground. An inspector must approve the wiring and plumbing,
and if such work does not meet certain specifications, the con-
tractor will be forced to correct the deficiency.
Where does a city obtain the power and authority to exercise
these controls? Such might be derived from legislative delegation 2
or arise directly from the state constitution.9" Generally this power
8 6 OL-s. CoNsT. art. IX, § 47.
87 15 OKLA. STAT. §§ 598.1-599.18 (1961). "Sales below cost with intent
and purpose of impairing and preventing fair competition... are prohibited
...." Section 598.3 was upheld in Safeway Stores v. Retail Grocers Ass'n,
322 P.2d 179 (Okla. 1957), aff'd 360 U.S. 334 (1959) and Adwon v. Okla-
homa Retail Grocers Ass'n, 204 Okla. 199, 228 P.2d 376 (1951).
8878 OELA. STAT. §§ 41-45 (1961). Non-signer portion of act held un-
constitutional as an improper delegation of legislative power and as violative
of due process.
89 59 OKLA. STAT. §§ 61-105 (1961).
90 71 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-504 (1961). Oklahoma blue sky laws were first
enacted in 1919 and the first Commission consisted of the Bank Commission-
ers, the Secretary of State, and the State Auditor. After numerous amend-
ments, Oklahoma adopted the Uniform Securities Act in 1959, 71 OKLA. STAT.
55 1-504 (1961).
9159 OKLA. STAT. §§ 771-782 (1961) was held unconstitutional in State
v. Wood, 207 Okla. 193, 248 P.2d 612 (1952). Even though it was held
unconstitutional and void in 1952, it was brought forward in the 1961 statute.92 Foster, The Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Officers,
7 ILL. L. REv. 397, 398 (1913). "Such a delegation to municipalities of a
power that is dearly legislative in its nature commonly goes unchallenged in
the courts, and when any comment is made it is referred to as an exception
to the general rule prohibiting the delegation of such power."
93 OKLA. CONST. art IX, § 18. This section specified duties of the Cor-
poration Commission. Within it, there is a proviso that "nothing in this
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is derived from legislative delegation; ,however, we need not be
too concerned with the source. It suffices to recognize the presence
of this power to control and regulate the affairs of local citizens.
No matter where one looks-be it city, state, or federal gov-
ernment- controls and regulations will be found. WE LIVE IN A
REGULATED ECONOMY AND NO LONGER IS THERE A
FRONTIER TO WHICH ONE MIGHT ESCAPE.
IV. AN ANSWER TO REGULATION CRITICS
A. Early attacks against administrative agencies
Early regulatory statutes brought cries that the country was
heading toward socialism, and that our cherished system of free
enterprise was being eliminated. With the imposition of each new
regulation and with the creation of each new agency, the cry of
socialism grew louder. Even today, there are those, including law-
yers, who voice this opinion.93 a
In Adwon v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assn.,94 the Unfair
Sales Act was attacked on the ground that it conflicted with "free-
dom of enterprise." To this attack the court replied: 'We are not
impressed .... 5 This same court had earlier held the precedent
Unfair Sales Act unconstitutional. 90 But in so doing the court
section shall impair the rights which have heretofore been, or may hereafter
be, conferred by law upon the authorities of any city . .. to prescribe rules,
regulations, or rates of charges to be observed by any public service (operat-
ing under a franchise granted by such city)." Under the section specifying
limitations on the Legislature, there is provided the following: "The Legisla-
ture shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any
local or special law authorizing: . . . Regulating the affairs of counties, cities,
towns, wards, or school districts; .... ." OKLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 46. These
constitutional provisions have been construed to mean that citizens of a city
may govern themselves as to matters purely local in nature. See City of Ard-
more v. Excise Board, 155 Okla. 126, 8 P.2d 2 (1932). Powers primarily sub-
ject to state control may be held by a municipality; however, such are sub-ject to the control of the legislature. City of Claremore v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 197 Okla. 223, 169 P.2d 299 (1946).
93a See Dutton, The Supreme Court's Natural Gas Act, 1 TuLSA L.J. 31,
32 (1964). Reviewing Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas, 372 U.S. 84
(1963), Mr. Dutton commented: "The decision provides the basis for cen-
tralizing all regulation of gas production in the Federal Power Commission.
Such a centralization will facilitate the socialization of the gas industry by
giving the federal government management of the essential means of pro-
duction." He continued by saying that: "Congress should act immediately to
repel this latest judicial invasion of its constitutionally delegated authority.
If it fails to do so, the system of checks and balances which protects all
liberty from governmental tyranny will suffer a critical, if not killing, blow."
The Northern Natural Gas case is also discussed in Meyers, Federal 1re-
emption and State Conservation, 77 HAnv. L. REv. 689 (1964). In this case,
it appeared that the jurisdictional question was argued as if there was a
clear cut division. There is't. It is impossible to seperate the jurisdiction of
federal regulatory agencies from the broad regulatory policy.
94204 Okla. 199, 228 P.2d 376 (1951).
95 Id. at 200, 228 P.2d at 378.
96Englebrecht v. Day, 201 Okla. 585, 208 P.2d 538 (1949).
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pointed out that it was not attacking the general control policy in-
volved.97 Reviewing unfair sales acts, the court stated:
"Some of the earlier acts in some of the states were held to be
unconstitutional as restrictive of the right of the individual to
sell his property at whatever price he could agree upon with
his purchaser. Other acts were declared unconstitutional be-
cause the business regulated was not affected with the public
interest, such as operating public utilities. But since the de-
cision in Nebbia v. People of State of N.Y .... , it is generally
recognized that there is no closed class or category of busi-
ness affected with the public interest and the function of
courts under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution is to determine in each case whether
under the circumstances the regulation is a reasonable exer-
tion of governmental regulations, or is arbitrary or discrim-
inating and that the phrase 'affected with a public interest' as
used in decisions upholding public regulation of business
affected with the public interest means only that an industry
for adequate reason is subject to control for the public good."98
The Supreme Court, in Nebbia v. New York,99 stated that:
"So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the
absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to
its purpose."'100 This broad statement could be construed to mean
that all reasonable regulations in the public interest would be up-
held. When is a regulation reasonable? In the Nebbia'01 case, the
Court stated that requirements of "due process" have not been met
where laws are found to be "arbitrary." Thus, we might say that a
"reasonable regulation" is one that is not arbitrary. Then, what does
"arbitrary" mean? In its broadest terms, an arbitrary decision would
be one not governed by any fixed rules or standards.
Another attack illegal delegation of legislative power, has
never had much force where a federal agency was involved;0 2 al-
though it has been reasonably successful against state regulatory
9r Ibfd. Speaking of the 1941 Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act, the court stated
that the defect in this act was merely in its wording-sales below cost "with
the intent, or effect, of inducing the purchase of other merchandise." 15
OKLA. STAT. § 593 (1941) [Emphasis added]. The Act was redrafted to read
"Sales below cost with intent and purpose . . . . 15 Oxr.A. STAT. § 598.3(1961).
98 201 Okla. at 588, 208 P.2d at 541.
09 291 U.S. 502 (1933). This case concerned a milk control statute.
100 Id. at 537.
101291 U.S. 502 (1933).
10 2 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poul-
try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). These are the only two
cases where Congress was held to have improperly delegated legislative power.
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legislation. 103 When courts say that there must be a standard to
support legislative delegation, one should not be so naive to think
that this standard must be precise. Such standards are sufficiently
definite and precise if Congress, the courts, and the general public
can ascertain whether the administrative agency has conformed
to them.104 This logomachy could be construed to mean that a
statute will be upheld unless some compelling reason for striking
it down is shown. To understand what courts are doing when a
statute is found to be an "improper delegation of legislative power,"
or when "lack of due process" is found, one must look deeper than
the bare judicial decision.
Decisions rendered in administrative law cases are not de-
termined by application of any simple formula. Each represents a
conflict between "public interest" and "private interest," and unless
this is recognized and accepted, one cannot adequately understand
the subtleties found in this area of the law. Where ones' mind is
controlled by political philosophy, it is difficult to grasp the thin
line that separates public from private interest. What we, as in-
dividuals, think about administrative agencies is immaterial; the
courts recognize such agencies as serving a useful public function.
With this recognition, courts have developed the rule that ones'
administrative remedies must first be exhausted before judicial
review will be granted. 0 5 Further, administrative officers have been
granted absolute immunity against liability where the act involved
was performed in the line of duty.10
On the other side of the scales rests "private interest," which
is still considered important in this Country and weighed heavily
by courts in reaching administrative law decisions. Are courts in-
fluenced by policy arguments which weigh this public and private
interest? Admittedly, they deny this and contend that policy mat-
ters are the concern of legislature. 07 But one need only to examine
the cases to be otherwise convinced. How else can the court's
reasoning in N.L.R.B. v. Tex-O-Kan'08 be explained?
The Tex-O.-Kan case involved an order issued by the N.L.R.B.
requiring an employer to (1) cease interference with union organ-
o3 American Home. Prod. Corp. v. Homsey, 361 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1961);
Bell Telephone Co. v. Driscoll, 343 Pa. 109, 21 A.2d 912 (1941); Chapel v.
Commonwealth, 197 Va. 406, 89 S.E.2d 337 (1955).
'
0 4 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
105 See SCHWARrZ, AN INTRODUCTiON To AmEI~cAN ADm n nr iE LAW
180-82 (2d ed. 1962).
106See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); see also Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
107 See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493 (1947),
where Justice Jackson recognized the policy argument that unionization of
foremen causes bad relations between management and labor since the fore-
man's loyalty is divided. To this argument Justice Jackson stated: "However
we might appraise the force of these arguments as a policy matter, we are
not authorized to base decision of a question of law upon them. They concern
the wisdom of the legislation ...."
108 122 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1941).
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ization, and (2) reinstate twenty-nine employees and indemnify
them for loss of pay. In upholding the first part of this order, the
court said: "a cease and desist order on this point costs no money
and only warns to observe a right which already existed; evidence
short of demonstration may easily justify such an order."109 But,
said the court: "Orders for reinstatement of employees with back
pay are somewhat different. They may impoverish or break an
employer .... 110 State courts are also equally influenced by the
balancing of public and private interest."i
B. Control of administrative agencies
Professor Schwartz, while considering the question of what is
administrative law, stated:
"The heavy emphasis today is upon the administrative pro-
cess itself-upon the procedures which the administration must
follow in exercising its powers of delegated legislation and ad-
judication. In this respect, administrative law, as we are using
that term, relates more to procedure and remedies than to
substantive law .... Administrative law in our sense is the
law controlling the administration, and not the law produced
by the administration."112
Students of administrative law should be concerned with both
the procedural and substantive aspects of this field. The main diffi-
culty with critics of regulatory statutes and administrative agencies
is that they stop short of the substantive law. They look only at
procedure and all that is visible to them are naked government
regulations on private enterprise. The only way for such critics
to understand the true nature of these regulations is to examine
substantive laws. This is important, for regulation critics are in-
109 Id. at 438.
110 Ibid.
111 State v. Wood, 207 Okla. 193, 248 P.2d 612 (1952) involved the
State's Watchmaking Act of 1945, 59 OKLA. STAT. §§ 771-782 (1961), which
required a person entering the business to take examination and to serve an
apprenticeship for four years. The defendant violated statute and the state
sought an injunction to restrain this violation. The Statute wa sheld uncon-
stitutional for lack of due process on the ground that a person has the right
to earn a living in his chosen field of work. But in Taylor v. State, 291 P.2d
1003 (Okla. 1955) the defendant was enjoined from holding himself out as
a doctor. His contention that he was being deprived of property without due
process was ignored. The first case was not affected with a public interest
while the second was. It could be argued that the first statute did not fall
under police powers. It could also be considered as a situation where private
interest out-weighed public interest. Other cases involving this question: Okla-
homa City v. Johnson, 183 Okla. 430, 82 P.2d 1057 (1938) involving regula-
tion fixing operating hours of barber shops. Compare American Home Prod.
Co. v. Homsey, 361 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1961), holding non-signer provision of
the Oklahoma Fair Trade Law unconstitutional with Herrin v. Arnold, 183
Okla. 392, 82 P.2d 977 (1938) where court upheld a delegation of power to
fix prices by the State Board of Barber Examiners.
112 SCMVV TZ, op. cit. supra note 105 at 6.
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effective when they argue that a statute is unconstitutional because
it is regulatory." 3 On the other hand, a critic can be extremely
effective if he accepts the agency and then seeks reasonable con-
trols that can be applied against regulatory bodies.
1. Are controls needed? Need for controls was clearly recog-
nized by the Supreme Court when it discussed the lack of proced-
ural safeguards in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S." 4 Control has
played an important role in deciding the outcome of cases with
emphasis being placed on administrative hearings and opportuni-
ty to be heard; availability of judicial review, and legislative super-
vision. 15 Courts .have not looked too kindly toward legislative
power being delegated to private persons" 6 or groups and boards
comprised of interested members of the regulated industry."7
Independent regulatory agencies are equally subject to judicial
and legislative control. Such measures are imperative to avoid
arbitrary and capricious administrative decisions, and the Supreme
Court has implied that such control will be exercised by courts.
In Kent v. Dulles," 8 we are told that the Court will give closer
scrutiny to a case involving our basic liberties. In SEC v. Chenery,
the Court stated that administrative decisions must be judged on
grounds disclosed in the record." 9 The Court further stated that
an orderly functioning of judicial review requires administrative
agencies to clearly disclose the grounds upon which its decisions
are based.120 It is this clarity, says the Court, that will vindicate
the administrative process.' 21
"1 Clients are not interested in a lawyer's political philosophy, they de-
sire to be represented.
"4 Supra note 102.
"5 In Boehl v. Sabre Jet Room, 349 P.2d 585, 590 (Alaska 1960) the
court in upholding an ABC Board regulation, stated that: 'The grant of gen-
eral rule-making power was necessary in order that the legislative objective
would not be frustrated." It then continued by recognizing the possibility of
abuse, arbitrariness and capriciousness but then added that the exercise of
the board's powers is hedged about by substantial safeguards. By way of
controls, the board must conduct public hearings; there is ample opportunity
for judicial review; and finally, there is legislative supervision.
"16 American Home Prod. Co. v. Homsey, 361 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1961),
improper delegation under the Oklahoma Fair Trade Act.
"7 State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux, 40 Cal.2d 436 254
P.2d 29 (1953); Chapel v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 406, 89 S.E.2d 337
(1955).118357 U.S. 116 (1958). "Liberty", through the right to travel, was
involved in this case.
119 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1942). This was the first Chenery case where the
court set aside an order isued by the S.E.C. which had been based on an
erroneous interpretation of a legal principle. See also SEC v. Chenery, 332
U.S. 194 (1947).
120 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1942).
121 Ibid. The court was here quoting from Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB
313 U.S. 177, 197 (1940). In the Phelps Dodge case, the Board had ordered
certain employees reinstated and be made whole for their loss of pay, by
paying a sum equal to what they normally would have earned less earnings
received from other sources during the paiticular period of time. The court
['Vol. 1, No. 2
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 1 [1964], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol1/iss2/2
ANSWER TO CRITICS
Recognizing the conflict between government regulation and
preservation of private interest, the need for controls becomes clear.
There must be a balancing of these interests and it is this which
creates the real problem.122 Control measures allow courts to pro-
tect private interests from over-zealous agencies, and at the same
time, such measures justify courts in affirming the existence of
regulations in the public interest. Unchained administrative power
invites arbitrariness, and as stated by Justice Day -"there is no
place in our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary
power." 23 Arbitrary power and the Constitution are antagonistic
and incompatible forces; one or the other must perish whenever
they are brought into conflict.'2 4 Responsibility is placed upon
courts to be watchful and to assure the public that arbitrary power
will be the force to perish. This is judicial control.
2. Are administrative agencies being effectively controlled?
Having decided that controls are needed, we must now determine
if there are, at the present time, adequate controls. Congress has
not exclusively left this problem with the courts. In fact, it has
been very active in the area and has enacted a number of bills
designed to either control or to curtail certain agency activity. Most
important among the control measures enacted by Congress is
the Administrative Procedure Act.'25 This Act has been viewed as
a Congressional directive for courts to assume more responsibility
for the reasonableness and fairness of agency decisions. 20 Many
states have enacted similar acts for the purpose of controlling
agency action,'12  and both Congress and State Legislatures are
active in studying and improving the administrative process. 28
While not within the scope of this paper to review the federal
and state administrative procedure acts, an examination should be
made of the provisions most important for effective control. Ref-
erence is made to the public information sections, for without ade-
added a further deduction of amounts which the workers "failed without ex-
cuse to earn." Workers were thus required to mitigate damages. This was
countered by the Board's contention that a doctrine of mitigation of damages
would complicate the administrative process. In upholding the lower court,
the Supreme Court stated at page 198 that: "the advantages of a simple rule
must be balanced against the importance of taking fair account, in a civilized
legal system, of every socially desirable factor in the final judgment."
'
22 For a good discussion of the balancing of interest, see Oklahoma
Press v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) especially at pp. 203, 204 and 213.
123 Garfield v. Goldsby 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908) quoted by Justice
Southerland in Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 24 (1935).
124 Jones v. SEC, supra note 123 at 24.
125 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1958).
120Universal Camera Corp. v. NLBB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1950).
127 Harris, Administrative Practice and Procedure: Comparative State
Legislation, 6 Ox.A. L. REv. 29 (1953).
128Bills: H.R. 7200, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Creation of an Ad-
ministrative Conference; H.R. 7202, 7203, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). De-
signed to promote the fair and efficient operation of certain administrative
agencies-all were sponsored by Mr. Harris in June, 1963; S. 1663, 88th Cong.,
19643
21
Thomas: An Answer to Regulation Critics--Control of Administrative Agenci
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1964
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
quate information, one cannot expect to control, in any manner,
the functions of agencies.
At the present time, it would be safe to say that the public
is not given sufficient information. Under section 3(c) of the fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act, it is much too easy for an
agency to withhold information.129 The effect of this condition can
best be shown by a little story told by Senator Dirksen.
"There was a farmer out in my State and he found to his
dismay a year or so ago that his acreage allotment had been
cut by the county committee. He went before the local com-
mittee and protested and showed them his figures. After
considering the matter the committee gave him back his acre-
age allotment but the next thing the farmer knew his acreage
allotment was reduced again. He made another trip to the
county committee and he asked why. He was told that the
Committee had received evidence against him. He asked what
that was so he could properly meet it and he was told that
under section 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act that in-
formation could be withheld from him.... The farmer asked
how he should meet the case against him if he did not know
what it is but he received no other answer."180
How can this farmer be convinced that federal agencies are
not arbitrary? After witnessing such incidents, how are regulation
critics convinced that administrative agencies perform a useful
purpose? Neither the farmer nor the critic will be convinced unless
there is free access to information held by agencies. Hopefully,
Congress will soon enact legislation to correct the situation in-
volving the public's right to information. 1 One bill, S. 1663, now
pending would amend section 3 (c) of the Administrative Procedure
Act as follows:
'Every agency shall, in accordance with published rule stat-
ing the time, place, and procedure to be followed, make its
records promptly available except those particular records ...
which are (1) specifically exempt from disclosure by statute,
1st Sess. (1963) would rewrite the Administrative Procedure Act. Oklahoma
adopted an Administrative Procedure Act in 1963, 75 OKLA. STAT. §§ 301-325
(Supp. 1963). It is general in nature.
129 Administrative Procedure Act § 3 (c). "Save as otherwise required
by statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule
be made available to persons properly and directly concerned except in-
formation held confidential for good cause found."
130 109 CoNG. BEc. 9387, 9389 (daily ed. June 4, 1963). Senator Dirk-
sen was speaking in support of the public information bill.
131S. 1664, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) established an administrative
conference. It was passed by the Senate on October 30, 1963 and was sent
to the House Judiciary Committee. Senate Hearings were held on October 18,
1963 on S. 1666, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) which involved the right to
information.
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(2) specifically required by executive order to be kept secret
for the protection of the national defense, and (3) the internal
memorandums of the members and employees of an agency
relating to the consideration and disposition of adjudicatory
and rule making matters . . . :,132
Burden of determining whether information should be kept
secret because of national defense would be placed on the exe-
cutive. This provides public control since the President, who would
be responsible, is an elected official. Agencies would no longer have
discretion to determine if certain records should be given secrecy;
rather, Congress would 'have to provide a specific exemption from
disclosure. This body, like the President, can be reached by the
ballot, thus assuring public control.
The current cry for public information is nothing new. It can
be traced back to the early days of James Madison and his con-
temporary, Thomas Jefferson, but these historic men do not de-
serve credit for the current move. Members of the newspaper pro-
fession, recognizing the need for public information, began the
attack on secrecy in local, state and federal government. Newspa-
pers across the land were reporting the difficulties in gaining admis-
sion to meetings of the city council, school board and county com-
mission. A domestic Freedom of Information Committee was es-
tablished, and in 1950, this committee retained the services of
Harold Cross'3 3 to make a study of news suppression. 34
Upon completion of his study in 1958, Dr. Cross made a de-
tailed report to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Prefac-
ing the report were these words:
'ublic business is the public's business. The people have the
right to know. Freedom of information is their just heritage.
Without that the citizens of a democracy have but changed
their kings.
The people are citizens, taxpayers, inhabitants, electors,
newsmen, authors, research workers, teachers, students, all
persons, each of us.
It is not enough merely to recognize philosophically or to pay
lip service to the important political justification for freedom
of information. It is not enough that by virtue of official grace
and incentives some information . . . does somehow become
available ....
Citizens of a self-governing society must have the legal right
to examine and investigate the conduct of its affairs, subject
132 This bill is presently resting in Senate Judiciary and has not been
reported out.
1S Harold Cross was a newspaper lawyer and was counsel for the New
York Herald Tribune. He also lectured at Columbia University on libel and
other laws affecting journalism. He died in 1959.
134 See CRoss, Tim PEoPLE'S Eion TO KNOW (1953), a report to the
American Society of Newspaper Editors.
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only to those limitations imposed by the most urgent public
necessity. To that end they must have the right to simple,
speedy enforcement procedure geared to cope with the dy-
namic expansion of government activity.
These rights must be elevated to a position of the highest
sanction if the people are to enter into full enjoyment of their
right to know. Freedom of information is the very foundation
for all these freedoms that the First Amendment of our Con-
stitution was intended to guarantee."13
Five years after the Cross report Congress enacted an amend-
ment to the so-called "housekeeping" statute. It provided that the
"housekeeping" statute did not authorize withholding information
from the public or limiting the availability of records to the
public.136 While an important step forward, this amendment had
a very limited scope. It did not provide that agencies must make
full public disclosure; it merely provided that this particular stat-
ute could not be relied upon to suppress information. There are,
however, other means of suppression, especially under section 3(c)
of the Administrative Procedure Act.137
There is an urgent and immediate need for strong legislation
requiring free access to public information. and to accomplish
such legislation, regulation critics could perform valuable services.
Rather than attacking all forms of regulations as unconstitutional
government interference, regulation critics would prove much
more effective if their efforts were exerted toward the passage of
a stong public information bill. As long as administrative agencies
are allowed to operate under a cloak of secrecy, there will be an
opportunity for abuse of power. Critics will continue accusing
agencies of rendering arbitrary decisions and the public will be
left thinking that perhaps the critic is right. What other reason
would an agency have in suppressing information?
Of course, one can think of rational reasons why agencies
might not favor free disclosure. Their interest is to effectively ad-
minister the functions delegated to them by Congress. To ac-
complish this, it is necessary to avoid any undue interference, and
perhaps free disclosure could be viewed as undue interference. This,
135 Supra note 134 at XIII-XIV. U. S. CoNsT. amend. I. "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.13 6 The "housekeeping" statute is found at 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958),
amended by 72 Stat. 547 (1958). In paying tribute to the late H. L. Cross,
James S. Pope stated: "I'll even say Congress would not have amended the
misused housekeeping statute (were it not for the Cross Report)." See Cnoss,
Ti PEOPLE'S BIGHT TO KNOw 1 (2d Supp. 1959). In Touhy v. Ragen, 340
U.S. 462 (1951) the court upheld agency (attorney general) power to issue
a regulation concerning the authority of subordinate officials to disclose evi-
dence. The regulation in question bad been promulgated under the authority
of 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958), before amendment.
137 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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however, is fallacious reasoning, for no agency should have the
discretion to suppress public information. 138
3. What are states doing to control agencies? Many states have
gone much further than the federal government in controlling
agencies through their administrative procedure acts.139 These acts
amount to a reaffirmation of the "checks and balance" system
which plays an important part in the very foundation of our legal
system. Belief in the competency and fairness of individual office
holders has never been enough to assure the general public against
arbitrary and capricious decisions. Such assurance comes from
controls - executive, legislative and judicial. The executive and
legislature are prompted to take action in accordance with the
public interest. Closely aligned with public interest is public opin-
ion and for the people to arrive at an intelligent conclusion, the
need for public information again becomes manifest.
A common feature of all administrative procedure acts is the
requirement that all rules and regulations be published or filed
with the Secretary of State. Some states require that prior to pro-
mulgation, there must be a review of rules by the state attorney
general. 140 A special committee or legislative interim committee
might be established to approve proposed rules.141 Another control
method would be the submission to the legislature of all rules
promulgated. In such cases the rules may be disapproved and
voided by legislative resolution.142
Perhaps the most effective control of agencies comes from in-
dividuals affected by particular promulgated rules and regulations.
Such control is possible only if rules in effect and proposed rules
are published. Persons interested are generally allowed to present
their views, and in some cases a public hearing may be held on a
proposed rule before it is promulgated. 143 In Oklahoma, an oral
hearing must be held on any proposed rule if request is made in
writing by twenty-five persons.
44
183 Using the term "public information" is intended to distinguish infor-
mation affecting the general public and that dealing strictly with internal
matters.
139 Harris, supra note 127.
140 Harris, supra note 127 at 37.
141 Connecticut has an Interim Legislative Review Committee to review
all regulations. The committee may hold public hearings and may disapprove
a regulation. Conn. Public Acts 1963, No. 559 at 768 amending CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 4-49 (1958).1 42 NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-904 (1943); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.9(d) (1950).
Rules may be rejected, changed, altered, amended, or modified; Com. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 4-49 (1958). See also, supra note 141; 75 OE-A. STAT. § 308
(Supp. 1963).
143 STATE MODEL Acr § 2; 75 OKLA. STAT. § 303 (Supp. 1963). For
discussion of Oklahoma's new act, see Merrill, Oklahomas New Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
14475 OxLA. STAT. § 303 (Supp. 1963). Oral hearing must also be held
if requested by a governmental subdivision or agency, or by a trade associa-
tion having at least twenty five members.
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Making information available, upon which individuals can
decide whether to present views or to contest a particular ruling,
is assured by an effective sanction. Rules not properly filed or pub-
lished according to statutory provisions are void and of no force
or effect.14 5 Virginia has a provision that administrative agencies
must publish rules in pamphlet form-with no more than one
supplement-and furnish a copy to any person who requests it.
If such pamphlets become unavailable for public distribution for
more than sixty consecutive days, the rules shall not be enforced
or enforceable. 1 4
Oklahoma administrative agencies face an interesting test con-
ceming the effect of not complying with requirements to file their
rules and regulations with the Secretary of State. In 1961, the
Oklahoma Legislature passed a rule-making statute requiring every
agency to file its rules and regulations. 147 If not filed prior to the
effective date of the statute, January 2, 1962, such rules are de-
clared void and of no effect.148 As of December 10, 1963, nearly
two years after the effective date of the statute, only thirty out
of 193 state agencies had filed their rules.1 49
It is too early to speculate on how the Oklahoma court will
handle this dilemma; however, there has been one trial court de-
cision rendered. Judge Clarence Mills granted a temporary order
halting all proceedings of the State Banking Department, but later,
he changed the order to apply only to certain specified proceedingsbefore the agency.'5 0 Constitutionality of the rule-making statute
was upheld in State v. Freenan,'5 ' where the court noted that
rules and regulations, not filed in accordance with statutory re-
quirements, were void. With this decision on the books, it mighttake legislative action to correct the possible chaotic condition.'5 2Whatever the solution might be, the Oklahoma court is pre-
sented with an opportunity to speak out in favor of free access
to public information. A strong stand should be taken, nor the
answer to regulation critics is control of administrative agencies.
To properly control such agencies, one must be properly informed.
145 STATE MODEL ACT § 3; CA.N. GmN. STAT. § 77-413 (1949); 75 0ELA.
STAT. § 2_52 ( 1961 ).
'
48 VA. CODE ANNm. § 9-6.7 (1950).
1 75 OKLA.. STAT. § 251 ( 1961).14875 OKLA. STAT. § 252 (1961).
'49 The Tulsa Tribune, Dec. 10, 1063, p. 20, Col. 3.
15o Ibid.
'5'370 P.2d 307 (Okla. 1962). The State filed an application seeking
writ prohibiting members of the Corporation Commission from complying
with the statute. It was held that rules of general application, to be valid,
must first be filed.
152 Unless a special legislative session is called, Oklahoma's Legislature
will not convene again until 1965.
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